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senate vote 2022-11-29#7
Edited by
mackay staff
on
2022-12-02 12:03:12
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Title
Bills — National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022, National Anti-Corruption Commission (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2022; in Committee- National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022 and another - in Committee - Appointment of commissioner and inspector
Description
<p class="speaker">David Pocock</p><p>POCOCK () (): I, and on behalf of the Australian Greens, move:</p>-
- The majority voted against an [amendment](https://www.openaustralia.org.au/senate/?gid=2022-11-29.239.1) introduced by ACT Senator [David Pocock](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/people/senate/act/david_pocock) (Independent) and NSW Senator [David Shoebridge](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/people/senate/nsw/david_shoebridge) (Greens), which means it failed.
- ### What does the amendment do?
- Senator Shoebridge [explained that](https://www.openaustralia.org.au/senate/?gid=2022-11-29.240.1):
- > *This amendment would provide for the oversight committee when it's considering just two critical issues, which are the appointment of the commissioner and the appointment of the inspector. It would provide that the oversight committee could only make that decision by a simple majority of members—not a super majority but a simple majority of members. It also provides that when determining that majority the provisions that provide for a casting vote of the chair do not apply. So, in other words, 50 per cent plus one of the members in attendance of the committee have to agree to the appointment of a commissioner or an inspector. Why is that important? It's important because it's hard to think of a more critical job for the oversight committee than determining who the commissioner and inspector of the NACC will be. On the current drafting, where the committee is six members of the government chosen from both houses and six non-government members—four of the opposition and two of the crossbench—chosen from each house, if there is an equality of votes then the government chair gets to determine the outcome. That effectively hands complete control to the government of the day in that critical decision about the appointment of a commissioner.*
- ### Amendment text
- > *(1) Clause 178, page 150 (after line 17), after subclause (2), insert:*
- >
- >> *(2A) If the proposed recommendation is for the appointment of the Commissioner or the Inspector:*
- >>
- >>> *(a) the decision to approve or reject the recommendation is to be determined by a simple majority of members of the Committee; and*
- >>>
- >>> *(b) paragraph 173(5)(b) does not apply in relation to a vote on a decision to approve or reject a proposed recommendation.*
<p class="italic">(1) Clause 178, page 150 (after line 17), after subclause (2), insert:</p><p class="italic">(2A) If the proposed recommendation is for the appointment of the Commissioner or the Inspector:</p><p class="italic">(a) the decision to approve or reject the recommendation is to be determined by a simple majority of members of the Committee; and</p><p class="italic">(b) paragraph 173(5)(b) does not apply in relation to a vote on a decision to approve or reject a proposed recommendation.</p> <p class="speaker">David Shoebridge</p><p>This amendment would provide for the oversight committee when it's considering just two critical issues, which are the appointment of the commissioner and the appointment of the inspector. It would provide that the oversight committee could only make that decision by a simple majority of members—not a super majority but a simple majority of members. It also provides that when determining that majority the provisions that provide for a casting vote of the chair do not apply. So, in other words, 50 per cent plus one of the members in attendance of the committee have to agree to the appointment of a commissioner or an inspector. Why is that important? It's important because it's hard to think of a more critical job for the oversight committee than determining who the commissioner and inspector of the NACC will be. On the current drafting, where the committee is six members of the government chosen from both houses and six non-government members—four of the opposition and two of the crossbench—chosen from each house, if there is an equality of votes then the government chair gets to determine the outcome. That effectively hands complete control to the government of the day in that critical decision about the appointment of a commissioner.</p><p>I acknowledge there's been a fair bit of public debate about that in the last 24 hours. There are propositions being put forward by the opposition to have a 75 per cent super majority. And, indeed, in the course of the inquiry, we heard time and again from the government and the opposition that you don't need to have any kind of super majority because these things are always done by consensus. We are told that it will always be unanimous, that everyone will always agree because that's how these committees work. If that's the case, if the expectation is that the proposed appointments will be of such quality it will always be done by consensus, where's the harm in acquiring just a simple majority?</p><p>We've heard from the government. They were very concerned that this would somehow provide a veto to the opposition. Well, far from providing a veto for an opposition, this gives the government of the day three potential avenues to get their commissioner appointed. They can get either of the crossbench members to agree, and, if either of them agree, there's the simple majority, or they can get the opposition to agree. That's three different avenues to get the government's appointment agreed. Why is that important? That's because we want to put a check and balance not just on the current government but we want to put a check and balance on a future government that may be much more noxious. We may actually want to appoint a commissioner to do over the opposition. We may want to appoint a commissioner to do harm. And of course there should be somebody other than the government of the day having oversight of the appointment of the commissioner so that it's not just a blank cheque.</p><p>So, the Greens firmly believe that this amendment gets the balance right. And I say 'the Greens', but I think a substantial chunk of the crossbench believes it, and I'd include the member for Indi, Dr Haines. And I know this is an amendment that was moved by Senator Pocock, and I appreciate and respect his position in this debate. This amendment gets the balance right. It's not a blank cheque for the government. It's not a veto for the opposition. But it is a check on the executive, and it is not just for this government but is about future-proofing the NACC.</p> <p class="speaker">Murray Watt</p><p>I thank Senators Pocock and Shoebridge for their amendment. The bill provides for multipartisan representation on the committee and ensures that the commission, including its key office holders, has the confidence of the parliament. It is the government's intention and sincere hope that appointments to the commission will receive multipartisan support. Broad parliamentary support for appointments will be integral to the commission's credibility. Proposed recommendations for appointments will be subject to transparent and merit based processes and statutory eligibility criteria. This will ensure that appointments are subject to appropriate oversight and that the recommended candidates for these important roles have the confidence of the parliament. It is appropriate that the government of the day, which has responsibility for government decisions regarding the commission, such as funding, hold the role of chair and have the casting vote. The government therefore does not support this amendment.</p> <p class="speaker">Michaelia Cash</p><p>The coalition will also not be supporting this amendment. The Senate will note that the coalition had previously moved an amendment in relation to, we believe, bipartisanship being best achieved with the three-quarters majority that we had proposed in our amendment, and I set out our reasons in my speech during the second reading debate. I do know that it was not supported by the Senate, and on that basis we won't be supporting this amendment, and the status quo as outlined by the minister will prevail.</p> <p class="speaker">David Pocock</p><p>Minister, I'm interested in why you think we should leave it to hope when we have an opportunity to legislate that the government of the day needs to simply convince one other member of the committee that they have the right commissioner. We've heard much criticism, and rightly so, for captain's picks by the executive over the years, and clearly there's a feeling amongst Australians that that needs to end. And here we have an opportunity to legislate a NACC that will ensure that the government of the day cannot just put whomever they like in there. Why aren't we doing that now?</p> <p class="speaker">Murray Watt</p><p>Thanks, Senator Pocock. As I indicated earlier, we believe that it is appropriate that the government of the day, which does have responsibility for government decisions regarding the commission, such as funding, also holds the role of chair and has the casting vote. But, as I said, it is certainly our intention that appointments to the commission will receive multipartisan support, and that's the way we'll be approaching it.</p><p class="italic">The CHAIR: The question before the chair is that amendment (1) on sheet 1775, standing in the names of Senators Pocock and Shoebridge, be agreed to.</p><p></p><p></p> -
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