Division Description Changes — Bills — National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022, National Anti-Corruption Commission (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2022; in Committee — 29th Nov 2022

Change	Division
senate vote 2022-11-29#4 Edited by mackay staff on 2022-12-02 11:22:52	Title Bills — National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022, National Anti-Corruption Commission (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2022; in Committee National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022 and another - in Committee - Pork barrelling, corrupt conduct definition and transparency Description ~~<p class="speaker">Dean Smith</p>~~ <p>The committee is considering the National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022 and the related bill, and amendments (1) to (6) on sheet 1769, moved by Senator David Pocock. The question is that the amendments be agreed to. Senator Shoebridge.</p> The majority voted against [amendments](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:legislation/billhome/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Famend%2Fr6917_amend_e3890526-cfb6-4c45-91d6-6d6215214722%22;rec=0) introduced by ACT Senator [David Pocock](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/people/senate/act/david_pocock) (Independent), which means they failed. ### What did these amendments do? Regarding amendments (1) to (4), Senator Pocock [explained that](https://www.openaustralia.org.au/senate/?gid=2022-11-29.55.1): *> These amendments were [moved by** the member for Indi](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/divisions/representatives/2022-11-24/3), [Helen Haines](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/people/representatives/indi/helen_haines), in the lower house. Again, I would like to thank her for her work on this issue over many years.* > *> These amendments make clear that pork-barrelling is c*orruption. We've seen concerns in communities across the country with the way that public funds have been allocated for political gain. This makes it clear that that can be investigated. I'm also concerned that this bill falls short when it comes to conduct by third parties that could impair public confidence in public administration—in particular, practices of collusive tendering, dishonestly obtaining benefit from public funding decisions and defrauding public revenue. This makes it clear that those are included. Regarding amendments (5) and (6), [he explained](https://www.openaustralia.org.au/senate/?gid=2022-11-29.61.1): *> This amendment will require the minister to table a statement of reasons if they deviate from the recommendations of the NACC joint select oversight committee in** relation to the budget. This does not bind the government to giving them that money; it simply provides an extra piece of transparency so that Australians know if we are short-changing the body that is going to be tasked with holding people in these places, public servants and others, who are using valuable Australian resources that should be spent in the best interests of Australians, to account.* ### Amendment text > (1) Clause 8, page 15 (line 20), at the end of subclause (1), add: > >> ; (e) any conduct of a public official that involves the allocation of public funds or other resources to targeted electors for partisan political purposes. > > (2) Clause 8, page 15 (after line 20), after subclause (1), insert: > >> (1A) Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) that impairs, or that could impair, public confidence in public administration and which could involve any of the following matters: >> >>> (a) collusive tendering; >>> *>>> (b) fraud in relation to applications for licences, permits or other authorities under legislation designed to protect health and safety or the environment or designed to facilitate** the management and commercial exploitation of resources;* >>> >>> (c) dishonestly obtaining or assisting in obtaining, or dishonestly benefiting from, the payment or application of public funds for private advantage or the disposition of public assets for private advantage; >>> >>> (d) defrauding the public revenue; >>> >>> (e) fraudulently obtaining or retaining employment or appointment as a public official. > > (3) Clause 8, page 15 (line 21), omit "does not", substitute "and subsection (1A) do not". > > (4) Clause 8, page 16 (line 15), after "paragraph (1)(a)", insert "or subsection (1A)". > > (5) Clause 177, page 148 (line 19), before "to review", insert "at least once every 12 months,". > > (6) Clause 177, page 148 (after line 30), after subclause (2), insert: > >> (2A) If: >> >>> (a) in a report mentioned in paragraph (1)(g), the Committee makes a recommendation in relation to the NACC's finances and resources; and >>> >>> (b) the Minister decides not to follow the recommendation; >>> >>> then: >>> >>> (c) the Minister must prepare a written statement of reasons for the decision not to follow the recommendation; and >>> >>> (d) the Minister must cause a copy of the statement of reasons to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sittings days of that House after making the decision. ~~<p class="speaker">David Shoebridge</p>~~ ~~<p>nator SHOEBRIDGE () (): I rise to speak about amendments (5) and (6) on sheet 1769, moved by Senator David Pocock. I particularly want to draw the committee's attention to amendment (6).</p>~~ <p>This amendment is about ensuring, as best we can, the financial independence of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. I know from my experience in state politics and with the New South Wales ICAC that one of the most effective ways the government of the day had of limiting the reach of that state anticorruption body was to strangle its funding. We've seen over the last decade in particular moves by the current coalition government in New South Wales literally to starve the Independent Commission Against Corruption of funds, and to do so with minimal public scrutiny. There is a multiparty oversight committee for the ICAC in New South Wales, but it has a retrospective role in reviewing the previous year's budget of the Independent Commission Against Corruption. It doesn't have the capacity to review the draft budget at budget estimates nor to make recommendations to the government of the day in the budget-making process.</p> <p>In the Commonwealth sphere, we have a very good working model in the role of the public finance committee, which is a multiparty committee. It reviews the finances of the Audit Office. We spoke to the Audit Office in the committee, and the Audit Office—admittedly, speaking only from their experience and, consciously, as good auditors do, not extending their practice themselves to the potential practice of the NACC oversight committee—said that it has worked extremely well for them. It has been a key reason why we have a genuinely independent and adequately funded Audit Office at the federal level. That's because the committee can review the budget estimates and make recommendations for the budget estimates in the budget process, to ensure that the Audit Office has the funds it needs.</p> <p>What Senator Pocock's amendment is doing here is saying, 'Well, if this oversight committee for the NACC undertakes that role'—and we have amendments that would give that explicit role for the committee, and I understand that the government and the opposition may not support those amendments but nevertheless acknowledge that there can be that proactive budget role in this committee, and we will address that when we get to it—and 'if the committee makes a recommendation to the government about the NACC's finances, and the minister decides not to follow that recommendation not to provide the funding in accordance with the committee's recommendation, then the minister has to explain him- or herself.'</p> <p>That is a key element of transparency. There are similar provisions that apply in other jurisdictions—most notably, right here in Canberra. The ACT Legislative Assembly's oversight committee has this exact same process. It is a committee with a non-government chair, a non-government majority, that oversights the budget of their anticorruption commission. When it makes a recommendation, if the ACT government does not accept it, if the treasurer doesn't accept the budget recommendation, then the treasurer has to explain that to the house in the course of the budget.</p> <p>We see it as a core transparency measure. What I'd hoped to hear from the government is, if they don't accept it in black and white, do they accept that that's the process that they expect to follow—that if the NACC oversight committee does make a recommendation about funding without being compelled to by this amendment then does the government expect that that's the practice that will be followed in due course once we get this NACC up and running?</p> ~~<p class="speaker">Murray Watt</p>~~ ~~<p>I addressed the government's position on this amendment when we were dealing with it before the break.</p>~~ ~~<p class="speaker">Dean Smith</p>~~ ~~<p>The question is that amendments (1) to (6) on sheet 1769 moved by Senator Pocock be agreed to.</p>~~ ~~<p></p>~~ ~~<p></p>~~

~~Dean Smith~~
The committee is considering the National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022 and the related bill, and amendments (1) to (6) on sheet 1769, moved by Senator David Pocock. The question is that the amendments be agreed to. Senator Shoebridge.
The majority voted against [amendments](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:legislation/billhome/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Famend%2Fr6917_amend_e3890526-cfb6-4c45-91d6-6d6215214722%22;rec=0) introduced by ACT Senator [David Pocock](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/people/senate/act/david_pocock) (Independent), which means they failed.
### What did these amendments do?
Regarding amendments (1) to (4), Senator Pocock [explained that](https://www.openaustralia.org.au/senate/?gid=2022-11-29.55.1):
> *These amendments were [moved by the member for Indi](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/divisions/representatives/2022-11-24/3), [Helen Haines](https://theyvoteforyou.org.au/people/representatives/indi/helen_haines), in the lower house. Again, I would like to thank her for her work on this issue over many years.*
>
> *These amendments make clear that pork-barrelling is corruption. We've seen concerns in communities across the country with the way that public funds have been allocated for political gain. This makes it clear that that can be investigated. I'm also concerned that this bill falls short when it comes to conduct by third parties that could impair public confidence in public administration—in particular, practices of collusive tendering, dishonestly obtaining benefit from public funding decisions and defrauding public revenue. This makes it clear that those are included.*
Regarding amendments (5) and (6), [he explained](https://www.openaustralia.org.au/senate/?gid=2022-11-29.61.1):
> *This amendment will require the minister to table a statement of reasons if they deviate from the recommendations of the NACC joint select oversight committee in relation to the budget. This does not bind the government to giving them that money; it simply provides an extra piece of transparency so that Australians know if we are short-changing the body that is going to be tasked with holding people in these places, public servants and others, who are using valuable Australian resources that should be spent in the best interests of Australians, to account.*
### Amendment text
> *(1) Clause 8, page 15 (line 20), at the end of subclause (1), add:*
>
>> *; (e) any conduct of a public official that involves the allocation of public funds or other resources to targeted electors for partisan political purposes.*
>
> *(2) Clause 8, page 15 (after line 20), after subclause (1), insert:*
>
>> *(1A) Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) that impairs, or that could impair, public confidence in public administration and which could involve any of the following matters:*
>>
>>> *(a) collusive tendering;*
>>>
>>> *(b) fraud in relation to applications for licences, permits or other authorities under legislation designed to protect health and safety or the environment or designed to facilitate the management and commercial exploitation of resources;*
>>>
>>> *(c) dishonestly obtaining or assisting in obtaining, or dishonestly benefiting from, the payment or application of public funds for private advantage or the disposition of public assets for private advantage;*
>>>
>>> *(d) defrauding the public revenue;*
>>>
>>> *(e) fraudulently obtaining or retaining employment or appointment as a public official.*
>
> *(3) Clause 8, page 15 (line 21), omit "does not", substitute "and subsection (1A) do not".*
>
> *(4) Clause 8, page 16 (line 15), after "paragraph (1)(a)", insert "or subsection (1A)".*
>
> *(5) Clause 177, page 148 (line 19), before "to review", insert "at least once every 12 months,".*
>
> *(6) Clause 177, page 148 (after line 30), after subclause (2), insert:*
>
>> *(2A) If:*
>>
>>> *(a) in a report mentioned in paragraph (1)(g), the Committee makes a recommendation in relation to the NACC's finances and resources; and*
>>>
>>> *(b) the Minister decides not to follow the recommendation;*
>>>
>>> *then:*
>>>
>>> *(c) the Minister must prepare a written statement of reasons for the decision not to follow the recommendation; and*
>>>
>>> *(d) the Minister must cause a copy of the statement of reasons to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sittings days of that House after making the decision.*
~~David Shoebridge~~
~~nator SHOEBRIDGE () (): I rise to speak about amendments (5) and (6) on sheet 1769, moved by Senator David Pocock. I particularly want to draw the committee's attention to amendment (6).~~
This amendment is about ensuring, as best we can, the financial independence of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. I know from my experience in state politics and with the New South Wales ICAC that one of the most effective ways the government of the day had of limiting the reach of that state anticorruption body was to strangle its funding. We've seen over the last decade in particular moves by the current coalition government in New South Wales literally to starve the Independent Commission Against Corruption of funds, and to do so with minimal public scrutiny. There is a multiparty oversight committee for the ICAC in New South Wales, but it has a retrospective role in reviewing the previous year's budget of the Independent Commission Against Corruption. It doesn't have the capacity to review the draft budget at budget estimates nor to make recommendations to the government of the day in the budget-making process.
In the Commonwealth sphere, we have a very good working model in the role of the public finance committee, which is a multiparty committee. It reviews the finances of the Audit Office. We spoke to the Audit Office in the committee, and the Audit Office—admittedly, speaking only from their experience and, consciously, as good auditors do, not extending their practice themselves to the potential practice of the NACC oversight committee—said that it has worked extremely well for them. It has been a key reason why we have a genuinely independent and adequately funded Audit Office at the federal level. That's because the committee can review the budget estimates and make recommendations for the budget estimates in the budget process, to ensure that the Audit Office has the funds it needs.
What Senator Pocock's amendment is doing here is saying, 'Well, if this oversight committee for the NACC undertakes that role'—and we have amendments that would give that explicit role for the committee, and I understand that the government and the opposition may not support those amendments but nevertheless acknowledge that there can be that proactive budget role in this committee, and we will address that when we get to it—and 'if the committee makes a recommendation to the government about the NACC's finances, and the minister decides not to follow that recommendation not to provide the funding in accordance with the committee's recommendation, then the minister has to explain him- or herself.'
That is a key element of transparency. There are similar provisions that apply in other jurisdictions—most notably, right here in Canberra. The ACT Legislative Assembly's oversight committee has this exact same process. It is a committee with a non-government chair, a non-government majority, that oversights the budget of their anticorruption commission. When it makes a recommendation, if the ACT government does not accept it, if the treasurer doesn't accept the budget recommendation, then the treasurer has to explain that to the house in the course of the budget.
We see it as a core transparency measure. What I'd hoped to hear from the government is, if they don't accept it in black and white, do they accept that that's the process that they expect to follow—that if the NACC oversight committee does make a recommendation about funding without being compelled to by this amendment then does the government expect that that's the practice that will be followed in due course once we get this NACC up and running?
~~Murray Watt~~
~~I addressed the government's position on this amendment when we were dealing with it before the break.~~
~~Dean Smith~~
~~The question is that amendments (1) to (6) on sheet 1769 moved by Senator Pocock be agreed to.~~
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